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Sierra Leone After the End of the
Armed Conflict
Serra Leoa depois do fim do conflito armado




1 On the 23 March 1991, a group of rebels calling itself the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) invaded the south-eastern corner of Sierra Leone, close to the Liberian border. The
insurgents used Liberia as a launching pad, and with the help of socially excluded groups
who were opposed to the authoritarian and kleptocratic policies of the ruling All People's
Congress (APC) aided by an «international brigade»1 who had fought in the Liberian civil
war embarked on a prolonged struggle to unseat the APC government of President Joseph
Momoh. The RUF's initial demand was to return Sierra Leone to a democratic pluralist
system, but this demand changed after the APC was toppled by a military coup in April
1992, led by a 27 year old army Captain, Valentine Strasser. These officers felt that the
rebels could be defeated if only good leadership could prevail at the centre. However, as
the conflict spread through out the country, and as demands grew for a return to civilian
rule, the National Provisional Revolutionary Council (NPRC), as this regime was called,
sought a settlement with the rebel forces. Before a settlement could be achieved, largely
due  to  pressure  from the  international  community  and  domestic  democratic  forces,
elections were held which saw the return of the Sierra Leone People's Party to power
under the leadership of Ahmed Tejan Kabba. Whilst Kabba sought a peaceful accord with
the leadership of the RUF, not all the major articles of the 1996 Abidjan Accord were
implemented. In particular, Kabba refused to «reward» the rebels with a place in the
government of national unity. Meanwhile, the problem of an undisciplined and restive
army continued to plague the Kabba administration. There were a number of reports of
coup  attempts,  and  at  the  time  of  the  May  1997  coup,  which  toppled  the  Kabba
government, there were a number of officers under arrest charged with treason. The
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coup plotters unleashed widespread violence on the civilian population,  this  time on
residents of the overcrowded capital Freetown. The junta had little or no support from
the civilian population, and met passive resistance from the population, as well as strong
opposition from the Kamajors (the nucleus of the civil defence force created by Kabba),
and the Nigerian-led Economic  Community  of  West  African States  Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), which was in Sierra Leone aiding the government to end the rebellion.
2 Among the reasons the junta put forward for overthrowing the civilian regime, was the
role played by the Kamajors, who were seen as usurping the power of the military. The
civilian government was confronted with an army whose command structure had broken
down, and one, which had been highly politicised by successive regimes and riddled with
corruption. In order to safeguard its security, the government gradually transformed an
arm of civil society (the Kamajors) into a quasi-national army. This further alienated the
army from the new regime, and the policy of reducing the size and privileges of the army
set the theatre for civilian-mil itary confrontation.
 
Background
3 By the time the RUF invaded Sierra Leone in March 1991, the APC had ruled Sierra Leone
for the preceding 23 years, initially under the leadership of Siaka Stevens, and since 1984,
by Stevens' chosen successor, kinsman, and Army Commander, Major-General Momoh, in
a stage-managed election of the Congress (Zack-Williams, 1985). The choice of Momoh as
successor to Stevens, (by-passing his Vice President and heir-apparent S. I. Koroma) upset
sections of the party hierarchy, and did not present a strong platform from which an
apparent phlegmatic leader can rule with supporters of the wounded former First Vice
President breathing down his throat. Partly for this reason, Stevens decided to retain the
position of Secretary General of the ruling Party. As we have pointed out above, Momoh's
regime was removed from office in 1992 by NPRC. After much domestic and international
pressure for a return to democratic pluralism, the NPRC prepared the country for the
return to  civilian rule,  but  before  they could hand over  to  the  elected Government,
Strasser  was  toppled  by  is  second-in-command  Brigadier  Julius  Maada-Bio  (Zack-
Williams, 1999; Zack-Williams & Riley 1993).
4 In March 1996, the NPRC handed the reins of government to the civilian regime of Ahmed
Tejan-Kabba, who was promptly removed from office in May 1997 by a group of rebellious
army officers calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under
the leadership of Major Johnny Koroma. The AFRC soon merged with the rebel RUF who
had  been  terrorising  the  country's  rural  areas  since  1991.  The  coalition  formed  a
«Peoples'  Army»,  and  then  demanded  the  release  of  the  leader  of  the  RUF  former
Corporal  Foday  Sankoh.  The  AFRC  I  RUF  regime  was  ousted  from  the  capital  by  a
reinforcement of Nigerian-led ECOMOC forces. However, on 6 January 1999, after much
warning and destructive activities in the provinces, the rebels returned to occupy a large
part of the capital. Wonton violence, killing, burning, looting, maiming and abducting of
young women and children marked their brief period of occupation. The result is that
after two weeks of rebel Pogrom, over a quarter of a million people in the capital had
been rendered homeless, thousands killed and even more people were wounded many
losing limbs. In what follows I want to look at the events leading up to the civil war, the
search for peace and the prospects for permanent peace.
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Patrimonialism and the politics of decline
5 In order to understand the factors,  which impelled a social  movement to invade the
south-eastern corner of Sierra Leone with the aim of toppling the APC government, one
has to look at the recent political-cum-economic history of the country. APC accession to
power marked the beginnings of «the decline of politics and the politics of decline» (Zack-
Williams, 1985: 202), as the economy began its long declivity in the midst of widespread
corruption and rent-seeking activities.
6 The main causal factor for the current crisis and the subsequent civil war could be traced
to the corrosive effects  of  the personalised authoritarian rule  by the APC under the
leadership of Siaka Stevens, which led to the destruction of civil society, and all forms of
opposition and any semblance of democratic accountability. This was paralleled with the
introduction of a whole network of client-patron relationship, recently described as «the
shadow state» (Reno, 1995). The activity of the shadow state and its reproduction are
premised on state access to sufficient revenue in order to placate clients. Here lies the
force majeure of «the politics of decline» in Sierra Leone. Now, by unleashing the full force
of the oppressive state apparatus on civil society, as well as imposing forced savings on
the peasantry (via the state controlled Sierra Leone Marketing Board), the APC destroyed
the enterprise and will of the people to be governed. The result is that peasant producers
withdrew from the formal  domestic  market  and the  educated classes,  and the  petty
bourgeoisie  migrated  to  greener  pastures.  Soon an  informal  economy and society  is
constructed, posing further threat to the legitimacy of the governing class. The latter's
reaction is «to patrimonialise state offices and resources... along ethnoclientelist and personalist
lines» (Kandeh, 1992: 30), thus stocking up further social and political discontent. (Zack-
Williams, 1990; 1998; & 1999) The destruction of democratic accountability was paralleled
with economic decline.
 
Fighting in Sierra Leone
7 In 1984, the ageing leader handed over power to his Force Commander, Major General
Momoh. Realising the unpopularity of his predecessor, Momoh tried to distance himself
from  his  sponsor's  policies  through  what  he  called  his  New  Order  Administration.  In
November 1986, Momoh concluded a long-term structural adjustment facility with the
Fund, as part of the new Economic Recovery Programme. In return for the usual macro-
economic conditionalities, (such as devaluation, reduction in the size of the bureaucracy,
removal of subsidies on essential commodities, deregulation of rice importation, ending
of the State controlled Marketing Board's monopoly on the importation of rice, the Fund
provided the government with standby credit to the tune of SDR 40.53 million. (Zack-
Williams, 1990).
8 In 1987 Momoh declared a State of Economic Emergency under which the government
assumed wide powers to crack down on corruption, gold and diamond smuggling, as well
as the hoarding of essential  commodities and the local currency. These policies were
designed to counter the thriving parallel market, to which the formal banking sector had
lost millions of  Leones.  Momoh went further in applying the conditionalities than his
predecessor2. Indeed, after the Fund had unilaterally abrogated the agreement in 1990
due to the government’s  inability to continue payment of  arrears,  Momoh embarked
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upon a «shadow programme», i.e. conditionalities without the loan to cushion the worst
effects. However, it was not long before these policies started taking their toll, as prices of
basic  commodities  soared to  astronomical  heights  and inflation ate  into  savings  and
wages.  Momoh's  position  in  the  Congress  was  never  as  omnipotent  as  compared  to
Stevens. Momoh was «an imposed candidate» for the presidency and leadership of the
party; he did not have any solid political base within the party; above all he was not as
shrewd  an  operator  as  his  predecessor  in  manipulating  the  various  factions  that
constituted Congress' shadow state. For many neutrals, Momoh was too phlegmatic, was a
very indecisive, weak leader who allowed his ministers free reign to be corrupt. There
were members of the «old brigade» who still saw him as «an ethnic upstart». Among
these  was  his  deputy,  and  former  SLPP  stalwart,  Francis  Minah  who  allegedly  used
Momoh's growing unpopularity as the basis to organise for a putsch, which resulted in
Minah's  execution for  high treason.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Minah hailed  from
Pujehun District, one of the areas that would define the front line of the civil war. Minah
had also been involved in the notorious Ndogboyosi conflict, «a rural rebellion in the
mid-1980s against the All  People's Congress Government of Siaka Stevens» (Riley and
Max-Sesay, 1995: 122).
9 Nonetheless, Minah's execution incensed many people from the Southern Province who
felt that it was all a plot by Northern zealots who wanted to deprive them of power, as
Minah was expected to succeed Momoh to the Presidency. In one swoop, Momoh became
alienated from two of the most powerful ethnic groups in the country, the Temnes from
the northern and central areas of the country and the Mendes from the south. Together,
these  two  groups  account  for  about  60  per  cent  of  the  total  population.  Momoh's
insensitivity reached new heights when he called for «ethnic corporatism» in one of his
broadcasts over the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service. He urged all his subjects to form
themselves  into  ethnic  cabals.  Indeed,  by  this  1990  broadcast,  to  the  Ekutay  Annual
Convention at Binkolo, Bombali District, Momoh confirmed what many political pundits
had by now often alluded to: mainly that power had shifted from Parliament and the
Cabinet to the Ekutay (Zack-Williarns, 2001a). The consequence of the growing influence
of the Ekutay in the affairs of state was to further worsen ethnic relations, and to speed
economic decline. 
10 By 1991 the first UNDP Index for Human Development put Sierra Leone at 165th out of
165 countries.  Momoh's control  of  state affairs soon started to slip away;  and in the
Eastern Province, of Kono District in particular, continued to retain its notoriety as the
«Wild West of West Africa», with a semi-permanent lawlessness in the diamond mining
areas.
11 By the early 1990s, the «democratic wind of change» had prevailed across the continent:
donors had instituted a return to democratic multi-party politics as a sine qua non for
official loans; Francophone Africa had popularised the system of National Convention as a
rites  de  passage  to  democratic  transformation.  Yet,  in  Sierra  Leone,  the  phlegmatic
leadership assumed an ostrich-like posture in the face of popular demands for democratic
pluralism, led by the Sierra Leone Bar Association, the university community, as well as
school  children and the unemployed3.  Momoh's response to demands for multi-party
elections was to quickly despatch the hawkish Secretary General of the Congress, E.T.
Kamara. He warned in particular, people in the South and Eastern Provinces that any talk
of multi-party democracy will be dealt with by the full force of the law, since all such
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discussions were illegal under the single-party state. The theatre was now set for social
contestation.
 
The RUF and state contestation 
12 Whilst  Momoh was busy trying to preserve the ancient  regime,  civil  war broke out in
neighbouring  Liberia,  which  soon engulfed  much of  Sierra  Leone.  A  group of  rebels
including veterans of the Liberian civil  war but of whom the majority were of Sierra
Leonean parentage,  who had formed a «revolutionary foco» in the 1980s,  decided to
strike at the south-eastern corner of the country. The reason why this group of Libyan
influenced international brigade chose this moment to oust the Momoh regime is not
clear. Ellis has argued that Charles Taylor the Liberian warlord felt aggrieved that the
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOC) prevented him
from taking control of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. In particular, Taylor was angry at
the duplicity of Sierra Leone government, whilst trying to act as peace-maker but at the
same time allowing ECOMOC to use its airport to bomb territories controlled by Taylor.
Thus,  Taylor «swore to avenge the interference in Liberia's internal affairs...  Taylor's
reaction was 'to do a RENAMO' on Sierra Leone» (Zack-Williams & Riley, 1993:93). Taylor's
surrogates and allies, the RUF, under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, a former disgraced
corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces invaded Sierra Leone's Eastern
Province causing widespread destruction and terror in the breadbasket of the nation.
13 Other writers, in particular Richards, see the RUF as a «group of revolutionaries inspired
by the notion of a Third Way (between Soviet-style one Party Rule and The Western-based
democracy) as advocated in Gaddafi's Green Book... and trained in guerrilla warfare in
Benghazi»  (Richards,  1995:1).  Richards  points  out  that  the  war  is  a  product  of  the
protracted,  post-colonial,  crisis  of  patrimonialism.  Abdullah  (1997;  1998;  Abdullah  &
Muana 1998) takes up the theme of the «revolutionary vanguard» and the influence of
Ghadaffi's Green Book and Kim IL Sung's juche ideas. He also points to the coming together
of «town and gown» as the children of the petty bourgeoisie were drawn into prolong
dialogue with lumpen elements in the Pote, where illegal drugs were used, cementing a
strong  counter-culture.  The  RUF,  which  provided  this  link  appealed  to  the  socially
excluded youth and all those in society, who felt alienated by APC rule. The confidence
the RUF had in the revolutionary potential of the Sierra Leonean youth and in its own
revolutionary weltanschauung,  meant that it  expected them to rally to the movement.
Instead, many young people, girls and boys were kidnapped into the movement, and the
wanton violence unleashed upon.
 
Political leadership and the conduct of the war
14 Momoh was unable to bring peace to the country, and both government and rebel forces
were accused of serious human rights abuse (Amnesty International, 1998). Momoh failed
to exploit the nationalist cause created by rebel wanton violence against civilians. By
mid-1991 the economy took a turn for the worse as agricultural production plummeted to
an all-time low of $10 million (Zack-Williams & Riley, 1993). The war continued to take its
toll not only on civilian lives, but also on the exchequer: by early 1992 over 10,000 people
had been killed,  300,000  displaced,  200,000  in  refugee  camps  in  Guinea,  and 400,000
trapped behind enemy lines. Meanwhile, Momoh tried to use the security situation as a
Sierra Leone After the End of the Armed Conflict
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2 | 2002
5
pretext to delay calling general elections, which in turn infuriated opposition leaders.
Troops  despatched  to  the  war  front  had  to  fight  with  obsolete  weapons.  More
significantly,  the  cost  of  the  war  effort  meant  that  the  military  could  no  longer  be
protected from the worst effects of the economic crisis, which had engulfed the nation.
The senior officer corps of the army, who had invested a lot in the corrupt system of the
Stevens-Momoh dynasty,  was relatively well  protected from the crisis.  These are the
people who had illegally built houses on state land to be rented out to foreign embassies
and companies to be paid in foreign exchange. In other words, the «top brass» in the
army indulged in the spoils of a decadent regime. Since this did not trickle down to the
junior officer corps this provided the basis for a split within the officer corps of the army.
In addition, the policy of sending young and potentially rebellious officers to the war
front had the effect of further alienating young officers from those officers who were
seen as occu pying position of opulence.
15 In  April1992,  Momoh  was  removed  from  office  by  a  group  of  relatively  young  and
unknown officers, led by an army Captain, Valentine Strasser who had escaped death
after being severely injured in hand to hand fighting with the RUF forces. In his first
interview after ousting Momoh, Strasser spoke of fighting the enemy with «obsolete guns
that will not fire», and how his friend died by his side. He was brought to the capital with
shrapnel in his leg to be operated on without anaesthetic, as none was available at the
main hospitals. To add insult to injury, the authorities refused to send Strasser and other
injured soldiers overseas for treatment because the country could not afford it. It seems
that this was the turning point, when these young officers, who were influenced by the
way Flight Lieutenant Rawlings had brought some discipline into Ghanaian economy and
society, decided to strike.
16 Strasser condemned the opulence and corruption of the Momoh administration and its
inability to prosecute the war successfully. He promised to bring peace to the nation,
though his period as leader saw growing rebel incursion all over the country. As part of
its anti-corruption crusade, the NPRC set up a number of commissions to inquire into the
assets  of  ex-Ministers  and  senior  civil  servants.  The  NPRC used  populist  rhetoric  of
redemption,  anti-corruption  and  personal  sacrifice.  Strasser  was  referred  to  as  «the
redeemer», and as in Ghana, economic orthodoxy was combined with the limited politics
of redistribution. After an initial, period of political isolation following the execution of
28 civilians and military officers, an accord was struck with the IFIs, and in exchange for
loans, Strasser implemented the programmes negotiated by his predecessor with the IMF.
The  stabilisation  programme  produced  widespread  unemployment,  as  over  30,000
workers were made redundant, though the figure was ameliorated by the rapid expansion
of the army mainly through conscription of «street children» and other lumpen elements.
 
War, Peace & Democracy
17 The popularity of the regime waned as domestic and international pressure for a return
to civilian rule mounted. On the war front the rebels continued to hit at targets in the
interior of the country, including occupying for a time the rich diamond fields of Kono
District, and on one occasion they were reported to be outside the limits of the capital
city. By this time it had become clear that the Sierra Leone army was no match for the
guerrilla  rebel  forces.  In early 1995 the military government obtained help from the
British Army Gurkhas, who were soon embroiled in an ambush in which their Canadian
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commander, Colonel Robert MacKenzie was killed (Riley, 1996). Shortly after, they left the
country, the South African based Executive Outcomes (EO) (Harding, 1997), who helped to
shift the balance in favour of the NPRC, by driving the rebels out of the diamond field,
replaced them. Nonetheless, EO remained a major drain on the Sierra Leone exchequer at
a cost of US$1.7 million a month (Riley, 1997). The scaling down of the fighting as a result
of a cease- fire, and demands from the IMF to reduce payment to the organisation, led the
civilian government to re-negotiate its agreement with Executive Outcomes, and their
early departure. The departure of Executive Outcomes saw the emergence of new fighting
force an adjunct of «civil society», the Kamajors, or Mende traditional hunters.
18 The Mendes of the southeast constitute the largest ethnic group accounting for some 30%
of the population of Sierra Leone and traditionally provide the bulk of support for the
Sierra Leone People's Party, the country's oldest political organisation, which had been in
the  political  wilderness  since  the  1967  elections.  The  Kamajors  had  distinguished
themselves in 1994 in a series of encounters around Bo (the country’s second largest
town)  with  elements  of  the  rebel  RUF.  In  these  clashes,  the  Kamajors  were  able  to
demystify some of the fetishism and claims of invincibility made by rebel forces, at a time
when the army had appeared incapable of confronting the RUF. As a result the influence
of the Kamajors grew, as they swapped «home-made rifles, machetes, and other crude
weapons... for more sophisticated weaponry» (Riley: 288).
19 By early 1994, the shine had rubbed off «Strasser the redeemer»: there was the scandal of
members of the junta being caught in diamond smuggling; Sierra Leoneans were getting
tired of the youthful antics of the young officers and their inability to end the war and
many  saw  the  transition  to  civilian  rule  as  a  prerequisite  for  ending  the  war.  The
immediate post-1994 period was marked by a heated debate between on the one hand,
those like the military that argued that it was important for peace to be negotiated before
presidential and parliamentary elections. They pointed out that free and fair elections
would not be possible under war conditions. On the other hand, there were those led by
civic organisations such as Women for a Morally Engaged Nation (WOMEN), and donors
who held that a speedy return to democratic pluralism was a sine qua non for peace in the
country. They argued that the military authorities were prevaricating on the issue of
returning the country to democratic rule. In their view Captain Strasser was trying to
swap military uniform for a civilian presidency à la President Rawlings of Ghana.
20 In January 1996, two months before the planned presidential and parliamentary elections,
schism emerged  within  the  NPRC,  which  resulted  in  Strasser  being  replaced  by  his
deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. This heightened public concerns about the intention
of the junta. With the civil war still raging, the transition to democratic rule reached its
climax with the elections of February and March 1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabba, leader of the
Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), was declared winner of the Presidential election with
almost 60 per cent of the votes after a run-off with the leader of the United National
Peoples' Party (UNPP) John Karefa Smart who polled just over 40 per cent of the votes. In
Parliament the SLPP won 27 of the 80 seats, and the main opposition the UNPP gained
only 17 seats.  Twelve seats were reserved for the Paramount Chiefs  from the twelve
districts. Though the SLPP did not have a majority they could count on the support of the
Paramount Chiefs.
21 The new government was faced with three major problems. First, to bring the war to an
end and to begin the task of national reconciliation, second, to embark on policies of
national reconstruction, including relocation of the population that had been displaced
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by the war. Finally, to secure discipline within the Armed Forces. The President in his
inaugural  speech  referred  to  the  three  «R»:  reconstruction,  reconciliation  and
rehabilitation.  In  particular,  Kabba  was  very  conscious  of  the  politicised  and
undisciplined armed forces that he had inherited from the NPRC. Recruitment into the
army for the previous three decades had been based on ethnic and political patronage,
and the army was regarded as an instrument of the ruling party, insulating it from the
people even if  this party became unpopular,  the army ensured it  remained in power
indefinitely.  The events  after  Aprill992 had destroyed the command structure of  the
army.
22 In order to achieve his stated goals, Kabba formed a National Coalition Government to
include the major parties in Parliament, as well as a rapprochement with the rebel leader,
Foday Sankoh. The reaction of Sankoh was to reject Kabba's approach, by insisting on
power sharing with the new government, if the latter was prepared to implement: «a
people's budget» to include free and compulsory education, affordable housing, clean
water, and sewage system in every village. Finally, Sankoh demanded the withdrawal of
all foreign troops including those of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, and Executive Outcomes
from the country, and the absorption of some of his fighters into the national army. The
government rejected Sankoh's demands, in particular his call for power-sharing. Instead
the government set up the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission based on the
model  of  South Africa's  Truth Commission,  to  investigate  and identify  the  causes  of
injustices against individuals and communities by the government. The government also
emphasised  its  determination  to  crack  down  on  corruption  among  public  servants
following  the  disappearance  of  500  Sierra  Leonean  passports,  including  diplomatic
passports.
23 The government's immediate concern was for peace with the RUF, as well  as finding
funds (estimated at $40 million) to facilitate the smooth demobilising and rehabilitation
into civilian life of soldiers and ex-RUF fighters. The search for peace was now being
conducted  on  two  fronts: by  the  Organisation  of  African  Unity  (OAU),  and  the
Commonwealth, though the rapprochement with the RUF continued as both sides agreed
a cease-fire, and the reciprocal release of prisoners, including thousands of children who
had been abducted by the RUF.
24 On the economic front, the economy continued to perform poorly, as agricultural and
mining production stood at a standstill  following rebel attack on farmers and mining
personnel and installations all over the country. The poor economic performance led in
September 1996 to the IMF demanding drastic cut in payment to Executive Outcomes
before the country could receive $200 million in foreign exchange funding for post-war
reconstruction. This resulted in a new agreement with EO, and much-reduced fees for
their services. In the same month there was an attempted coup, leading to the retirement
of 26 officers and 155 non-commissioned officers from the army. In December 1996, just a
month after the conclusion of a peace accord with the RUF, 18 people were arrested after
the revelation of a coup attempt. Despite this clear evidence of dissatisfaction within the
army, as a result of demands made by the IFIs, in January 1997 the government decided to
cut the subsidised rice supplies to the army police and prison services.  In that same
month, rice importation from South Asia alone cost the country some $30 million, and
with this being sold in the open market for Le 23,000 a bag, the price of Le 1,000 to
military personnel points to the size of the subsidy this group enjoyed. Heavily subsidised
rice has always been the hallmark of military life since the days of Siaka Stevens. The
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same month the cut in subsidies was announced there was yet another coup, as a result of
which 5 officers were arrested, including Captain Paul Thomas, one of the leaders of the
May 25 coup.
25 The  growing  indiscipline  within  the  ranks  of  the  army  made  the  government  more
dependent on the Kamajors, who by now had assumed the status of an ethnic praetorian
guard. This was particularly the case after the departure of Executive Outcomes and the
failure  of  the  United  Nations  to  send  peacekeeping  troops  to  supervise  the  Peace
Agreement4. This growing dependence of the government on the Kamajors for security,
worsened the army-Kamajor relations, and this was reflected in the growing number of
clashes between the two forces. The Kamajors saw the army as ineffective, corrupt and
unpatriotic, as reflected in the in the rise of the Sobels and their inability to make any
significant impact on the RUF.  Sobels (soldier/rebels)  were renegade elements of  the
national army who would loot private property and work the diamond fields during the
night and then return to soldiering activities during the day. The army was accused of
trying to undermine the first Southern dominated government in thirty years, and was
seen as an offshoot of both the APC and the NPRC. In short, the Kamajors saw the army as
a threat to the country's new democracy.
26 On the army's part, the Kamajors were a major threat to national unity and a tool in the
sectional  divide,  a group seeking to challenge the army's  monopoly of  the means of
violence. For example, in March 1996, the civilian government ordered the Kamajors and
the army to flush out rebels who had attacked civilians. The army felt that their role «as
custodians of state security and defenders of the constitution» was being challenged by the
Kamajors.  As  such the  army saw the  Kamajors  as  a  danger  to  the  state.  The  Kabba
administration became increasingly dependent on the Kamajors for security5. The major
link between the government and the Kamajors was Deputy Minister of Defence, Samuel
Hinga Norman, who is also leader of the Kamajors.
27 Within a short period of time, the stature of the Kamajors rose from «ethnic hunters» to
quasi-national  army.  The  growing  confidence  in  dealing  with  rebels  impelled  the
Kamajors  to  confront  other  civic  associations,  particularly  in  the  North,  but  also  in
Matotoka, Bo, Kenema and Zimmi. Corporal Gborie, who announced that the military had
seized power in May 1997, accused the Kabba administration of «crying down the army»,
and  of  «tribalism».  Inevitably,  one  of  the  first  acts  of  the  junta  was  to  outlaw  the
Kamajors, who in turn indicated their desire to mobilise 35,000 of their number for a
march on Freetown to oust the renegade soldiers.
 
Structural obstacles in peace building
28 A sense of economic and political insecurity among the population, the unresolved civil
war, the Kamajor-army conflicts, the loss of privileges by the army and their perceived
sense of insecurity, following calls to prune the army by the IFIs, were all major factors
behind the insurgencies of May 25, 1997; January 1999; and May 2000. It is important to
note that in the last instance the army would intervene in politics largely for military
reasons (First, 1972). Charges of corruption against ousted regimes whilst this may be
true; yet, it is a rationalisation central to all dawn broadcasts following a military take-
over. In the end the military tends to intervene to remove a civilian government when
perceived corporate interests are threatened. In the case of Sierra Leone, because of the
clientelistic mode of accumulation, junior officers of the armed forces often develop a
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sense of political and economic marginalisation, a perception that often leads them to
exaggerate their support among the public.
29 Bad policy on the part of the ousted regime helped to create this illusion of the popular
need for the military to intervene. In the case of the Kabba regime there were quite a few
poorly conceived policies, some of which we have already discussed. The first relate to
security.  The  dependence  on  the  Kamajors  for  security  meant  that  the  security  of
«Kamajor country» (South and Eastern Provinces) were guaranteed, but at the expense of
the security of the capital. This lapse in security meant that for the first time the rebels
were able to enter the capital after prisoners were released by members of the AFRC, and
an alliance was forged with the RUF to form a «People Army». Similarly, Kabba's failure to
bring officers accused of plotting to overthrow his government to justice helped to foster
an image of a weak and indecisive leader. This perception of a weak leader was not helped
by the abruptly ending of the trial of an ex-Foreign Minister who had been accused of
selling the country's passport to British-Hong Kong nationals. Furthermore, the generous
terms  and  conditions  that  were  offered  to  the  disgraced  former  president  Momoh
astonished many Sierra Leoneans. These included: a very generous pension of Le 900, 000
a house with servants, a car with a driver and bodyguards. Momoh's triumphalist manner
and speeches helped to whip up anti-government sentiments. He claimed that he was not
allowed to face the people in general elections before the army ousted him, and he used
the opportunity to declare his return to active politics.
30 Furthermore,  Many Sierra Leoneans were disappointed at the composition of Kabba's
Cabinet and style of government. It was felt that he would have brought young, dynamic
people  who  had  not  been contaminated  by  the  politics  of  kleptocracy.  Instead,  the
Cabinet consisted of  discredited former SLPP politicians.  Whilst  his own honesty and
integrity was not being questioned, it was felt that he was «only paying lip-service to the
welfare of the people; phlegmatic and carefree to the security and financial irregularities
in government» (West Africa, 1997a: 868.) One commentator observed that: «the pluralist
politics of democratic exchanges had deteriorated to an acrimonious and divisive process
of exchanges and in division in Parliament» (West Africa, 1997b: 1118) This politics of
attrition was symptomatic of the «character assassination by government stalwarts of
prominent and influential figures in opposition» (ibid: 1118) leading to the suspension
from Parliament of John Karefa Smart, the opposition leader. Opposition parties blamed
Kabba in particular for not doing enough to prevent his suspension. Finally, there was
growing  indiscipline  within  the  ruling  party.  There  was  much  talk  of  Kabba  «the
northern» being replaced by a Mende from the South later on in 1997.
31 One feature of the civil war is the prominent role played by child combatants. Many of
these  were  abducted  by  both  sides  and  in  the  case  of  the  RUF  after  a  period  of
socialisation into violence,  including violence against  their  community and relations;
they were employed into various areas of  military life.  Girls and young women were
turned into sex slaves of military commanders (Zack-Williams, 2001b). The active role
played by children posed a major problem not just for peacekeepers, but also for the
government's  demobilisation and reintegration programmes  and a  major  the  Special
court,  which has  been set  up  to  deal  with  abuse  of  human rights.  It  has  now been
established that minors will not be brought in front of the Court.
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Lomé and after
32 In July 1999, a peace accord was struck between the government and the leadership of the
RUF.  Under this  agreement,  the RUF leader became effectively Vice President  of  the
country and he was made Chair of  the Commission for the Management of  Strategic
Resources,  Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD), which him in charge of all  the
country's mineral resources, in addition, a number of his field commanders were awarded
cabinet  positions.  Furthermore,  rebel  leaders  were  granted  blanket  immunity  from
prosecution for human right violations. The accord was imposed upon the democratically
elected President Ahmed Tejan Kabba who was summoned to Lomé to sign the accord by
Western leaders led by United States Special Presidential Adviser on Africa, the Rev. Jesse
Jackson.  Western leaders who had become concerned about the blood-letting in that
country, but who had no intention of sending in troops into Africa's futile wars following
the US debacle in Somalia, thought that any deal that would bring peace to that troubled
land was good enough for them. Furthermore, Kabba had failed to seize the initiative to
impose a settlement on the rebel leadership at a time when their morale was low and the
government could have negotiated from a position of strength, following the destruction
of the rebel's Headquarters at Zogoda in 1996 by the Kamajors. However, by the time of
the Lomé Peace Conference, the RUF had regrouped and seized the initiative to occupy
some  two  thirds  of  the  country  land  space.  At  the  time  of  the  Lomé  Accord,  the
government controlled only the capital and major towns, such as Bo and Kenema, with
the mining areas and the rich agricultural lands under rebel control. The Accord led to
major outcry among human right defenders, including Mary Robinson, UN Ambassador.
There were demands for justice for the tens of thousands of those killed, raped and the
thousands of the amputees in the country.
33 The favourable settlement, which was accorded the RUF, emboldened Sankoh to continue
his nefarious activities of swapping diamonds for weapons, as he made an unannounced
visit to South Africa, which took the government of Sierra Leone and the international
community by surprise, before he was declared persona non grata. Also documents found
in his house at the time of his arrest in May 2000, showed that Sankoh was still prepared
to sell the country's diamonds through informal networks. Finally, in May 2000, as the
last Nigerian ECOMOG troops left the country, Sankoh decided to make a final push to
seize power as his followers unleashed a military take over. The population of the capital
took to the street marching on Sankoh's house where his guards opened fire,  killing
scores of unarmed demonstrators. In the ensuing mayhem Sankoh was able to escape
only to be captured a few days later,  in Babadori some seven miles from the capital,
trying to seek help from the Nigerian embassy to flee the country. Meanwhile, the crisis
had attracted British paratroopers who had been despatched to the capital under the
guise of evacuating British and Commonwealth citizens from the troubled country. The
paratroopers were able to rescue Sankoh from a lynching mob, but they also brought
reassurance to the anxious population, but not before a group of British troops were
ambushed by remnants  of  the  AFRC,  who had been engaged in  widespread banditry
outside the city limits. In an attempt to release their comrades, the troops were able to
clear the area of the «Westside Boys» (as these bandits became known), thus ending the
siege to the city, thus paving the way for UN troops (who had been humiliated by the
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Westside Boys, when a number of UN peacekeeping force was abducted together with
their weapon and armoured cars) to effect the demobilisation process.
 
Demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration
34 It  is  clear that demobilisation and reintegration of  ex-fighters is  the key to effective
transition from war to peace (Colletta, 1997; Colletta et al, 1996). By the end of January
2002, when both government and RUF leaders declared an end to the war some 46,000 ex-
combatants had been demobilised and have entered the reintegration and resettlement
process.  Plans  for  demobilising  members  of  the  various  fighting  forces,  which  were
instituted  following  the  Abidjan  Accord  in  November  1996,  were  swiftly  abandoned
following the coup in May 1997 (Kingma, 1997), but were reinstated as a consequence of
the Lomé Accord. The UN peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was given the
sole responsibility for disarming and demobilising ex-combatants who would assemble at
designated points, after which they would be handed over to various NGOs, including
UNICEF, the Red Cross and the catholic relief agency, CARITAS. Ex-fighters were able to
swap weapons for cash, before being discharged to various agencies, which would then
embark on a process of de-traumatisation, particularly in the case of the children, family
tracing and the process  of  uniting them with their  family.  Many ex-combatants  had
indicated their desire to be trained in various skills and in the case children, the desire to
resume a  disrupted education.  After  the  de-traumatisation each ex-combatant  would
then be apprenticed to trades person, including carpenters and joiners, mechanics and
masons along with a an «entitlement package» which provide a safety net during the
transition period from war to peace. This includes a set of tools, uniform to go with the
trade and financial  allowances.  The trade's  person receives  financial  inducement  for
participating in the scheme, whilst the new apprentice receives regular subvention for
the duration of the training. The down turn in the country's economy meant that many
who completed their training could not find jobs, heightening the sense of deja vue among
ex-fighters.
35 The programme has  been dogged by a  series  of  problems.  First,  as  noted above the
programme has had to be abandoned in a kind of stop-go process, due to the resumption
of fighting by the various war factions. Second, the failed state, which constitutes the
Sierra  Leone  government,  became  over-dependent  on  donors  for  financing  the
demobilisation process, and funding was not always forthcoming. By August 2001, the
Paris  Club  had  provided  some  $31  million  for  the  disarmament,  demobilisation  and
reintegration programme. Third, serial demobilisation has been a serious problem with
ex-fighters bringing out one or two weapons only to return with some more, in order to
obtain more funds. It is widely known that not all the weapons have been handed in at
the demobilisation centres.
36 These problems aside, many children who caused so much destruction in their villages
and town found that on their return that their parents had disowned them. Similarly,
many young fighters  who had spent  a  considerable  amount  of  time with the armed
factions, now considered them parents-surrogates and do not want to be united with
their  parents.  Girls  and young women who returned with their  babies found further
rejections, not just by parents, but also head teachers and principals refused to register
them  in  their  schools.  Many  returned  with  major  gynaecological  problems.  Ex-
combatants,  especially  children  face  widespread  stigmatisation,  in  spite  of  the
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government's  attempt  to  promote  a  policy  of  peace  and  forgiveness.  They  usually
referred  to  as  rebel  children,  and seen by  an  already  impoverished population  as  a
privilege group who are being rewarded for the destruction they caused to their country.
This can be a major source of potential conflicts between ex-combatants and the poor
members of society, many of whom lost their property and source of livelihood as a result
of rebel activities. The process of reintegration and reconciliation involves traditional
leaders, significant others in society as well as traditional ideas, including libation.
 
Conclusion
37 In this paper I have tried to analyse the events leading to the civil war in Sierra Leone. In
looking at the causal factors, we note that they were a reflection of the nature of state
and politics in Sierra Leone. The institutional fragility of the state was alluded to and
attention  drawn  to  the  inability  of  the  governing  class  to  secure  compliance  from
subordinated groups to their rule. The result was that violence was an important tool for
legitimisation. We also pointed to the role patron-client relationship played in political
legitimisation in Sierra Leone.  Those who were not part  of  the «shadow state» were
coerced into silence or forced into exile. The latter group constitutes the vanguard of the
RUF. The series of structural adjustment programme deployed by successive governments
in the 1980s and 1990s had a destructive effect upon vulnerable groups and reduced the
employment  prospects  of  many  secondary  school-leavers  and  university  graduates
impelling them into opposition of the ruling party.
38 In  this  «normal»  working  of  the  economy,  many  individuals  were  hurled  into  the
informal  economy,  thereby bringing into  question the  legitimacy of  the  state.  In  an
attempt to strengthen his grip on society Stevens instituted the one party-state, which
tended to alienate a major sector of society, mainly those from the south-eastern corner
of the country. It is within this social sector of society that the rebel movement initially
gained support.
39 There was a gradual increase in violence after 1991, and this reached climaxes in the May
25 1997 and January 1999 when the capital was attacked. It was this that brought the war
to  the  attention  of  the  international  community.  We  noted  despite  the  three  peace
accords  signed  by  both  side,  yet  peace  never  came  to  Sierra  Leone,  because the
government failed to utilise  a  position of  strength (after  the Kamajors over-ran RUF
headquarters) to impose its terms on the rebels. The departure of Executive Outcomes at
the behest of the IMF meant that the government forces soon lost the initiative as the
RUF regrouped, aided by Charles Taylor in Liberia and soon occupied the mining and
agricultural districts. By the time of the Lomé Accord the government controlled less
than a third of the country. As a result, a solution was imposed from outside, which in
turn emboldened the RUF. We noted the events of May 2000, which brought British troops
into the war led to the breakthrough for peace. The defeat of the Westside Boys meant
that  it  was  possible  for  the  UNAMSIL  to  move  into  interior  in  order  to  start  the
demobilisation, reintegration and resettlement process. We have drawn attention to the
importance of the demobilisation reintegration and resettlement process in the period of
transition to peace, a process, which ended in January 2002 as Sierra Leone prepares for
parliamentary and presidential election in May 2002.
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NOTES
1. Consisting mainly of Liberians, Bukinabese and other Africans.
2. Stevens was always aware that full implementation may unleash social forces beyond
his control.
3. These would all be key social actors in the impending civil war.
4. These were known as the Neutral Monitoring Group, under Article 11 of the Abidjan
Accord.
5. Kabba was only following in the footsteps of Steven's in utilising an ethnic praetorian
guard to consolidate power. See Zack-Williams, 2001a.
ABSTRACTS
Since  March  1991,  Sierra  Leone  has  experienced  continuous  civil  strife  culminating  in  a
protracted civil war, leading to widespread destructions of infrastructures and property, and the
death of  thousands of  people,  many more injured and over half  of  the population displaced.
Three  peace  accords  were  signed  in  1996,  1997  and  1999  in  Abidjan,  Conakry  and  Lame
respectively. However, these agreements did not bring peace. In this paper, the author situates
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the reasons and the nature of the conflict,  the events leading to both government and rebel
leaders declaring in January 2002 the end to conflict. Finally, he looks at Sierra Leone following
the formal declaration of an end to the war.
Desde Março de 1991, a Serra Leoa viveu uma experiencia de permanentes conflitos violentes
envolvendo populações civil,  experiência esta que desembocou numa verdadeira guerra civil,
com a destruição em larga escala de infra-estruturas e propriedades, a morte de milhares de
pessoas,  um número muito maior de feridos,  e mais de metade da população deslocada. Três
acordos  de  paz  foram  assinados  —  em  1996  (Abidjan),  1997  (Conakry)  e  1999  (Lame),
respectivamente.  Porém,  nenhum deles  trouxe a  paz.  No presente  artigo,  o  autor  localiza  as
razoes e a natureza do conflito, e os acontecimentos que levaram o governo e os líderes rebeldes
a declarar o conflito terminado, em Janeiro de 2002. Na parte final analisa a situação Serra Leoa
desta «declaração de fim de guerra».
Dès  mars  1991,  la  Sierra  Leone  a  vécu  une  expérience  de  continuels  conflits  violents  qui
impliquaient des populations civiles. Cette expérience a débouché sur une vraie guerre civile,
avec  destruction  à  grande  échelle  d'infrastructures  et  propriétés,  la  mort  de  milliers  de
personnes, un nombre encore plus grand de blessés, et plus de moitié de la population déplacée.
Trois  accords  de  paix  ont  été  signés  —  en  1996  (Abidjan),  1997  (Conakry)et  1999  (Lame),
respectivement. Cependant, aucun d'entre eux n'a produit la paix. Dans l'article qui suit, l'auteur
localise  les  raisons  et  la  nature  du  conflit  ainsi  que  les  évènements  que  ont  conduit  le
gouvernement et les chefs rebelles a déclarer le conflit comme terminé, en janvier 2002. Dans la
parte finale il analyse les résultats de cette « déclaration de fin de guerre » en Sierra Léone.
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